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Brittany Broome is a December 2020 graduate of UNC-Chapel Hill who double majored in 
Public Policy and Global Studies with a minor in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). 
This course of study has allowed her to investigate US foreign policy and its intersection with 
social movements on the world stage. Through this, Brittany Broome became interested in in-
vestigating the role that human rights considerations play in international agenda-setting. Her 
Internationalist piece is the culmination of her research into the Carter administration’s human 
rights-focused foreign policy strategy which is understood to be the first time an American Pres-
ident made human rights a top priority in conducting foreign affairs.
rights atrocities.
     This paper will discuss the dynam-
ics of Argentina’s so-called Guerra 
Sucia or “Dirty War.” It will then 
move to explain how Washington, 
D.C.  handled the junta’s rise to pow-
er before the Carter administration, 
primarily focusing on Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger’s actions, as 
well as how the government’s po-
sition evolved once Jimmy Carter 
took office. The paper will analyze 
the policy decisions Carter made as 
president and his administration’s 
actions. Under Carter, the US gov-
ernment’s strong stance against the 
Argentine government’s abuse of its 
citizens led to the improvement of 
conditions in the country and the 
recognition of soft power diploma-
cy’s necessity.1
     President Jimmy Carter was the 
first contemporary American pres-
ident to place human rights at the 
forefront of his foreign policy agen-
da, both rhetorically and in action.2 
Understandably, his policies, on a 
grand scale, were not always regard-
ed as successful in achieving human 
rights-related ends in every corner 
of the globe.3 Nonetheless, his ad-
ministration served as a trailblazer 
for the government-mandated in-
clusion of human rights in foreign 
policy.4 Though Carter-style rela-
tions with abusive regimes did not 
continue into the Reagan adminis-
tration, the sentiment and intention 
of his team’s human rights-focused 
policies were undeniably formative. 
Today, the United States’ he-gemonic position in inter-national affairs is undeni-
able. In this role, the United States 
government has claimed to be a 
champion of human rights in the 
world, though, the integrity of this 
assertion is subject to much debate. 
President Jimmy Carter played an 
instrumental role in shaping how 
the government considers interna-
tional human rights in its formula-
tion of a foreign policy agenda. A 
key example of this phenomenon is 
the Carter administration’s handling 
of relations with Latin America, 
specifically Argentina, during the 
late 1970s and into the early 1980s— 
a time when the governing military 
junta was committing gross human 
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Current and future American gov-
ernments can still find these policies 
useful in considering how the Unit-
ed States government should move 
forward in international affairs to-
day. As highlighted through his ef-
forts in Argentina, President Jimmy 
Carter placed soft power, centered 
around human rights protections, at 
the heart of American international 
policy— an action that changed the 
fabric and character of the United 
States’ diplomatic practice as it was 
known.5 This paper argues that, 
while the Carter administration 
cannot be cited as the direct source 
for the fall of the junta in 1983, its 
aggressive policies against Argen-
tina’s human rights abuses inserted 
the issue of human rights saliently 




     Argentina’s “Dirty War” marks 
a time in the country’s history that 
is colored by gross human rights 
abuses by the military junta gov-
ernment. Officially, the war began 
with a coup d’état in 1976 and end-
ed when the junta fell from power 
in 1983. Moreover, Argentines were 
already familiar with social unrest 
and terrorist violence in the years 
leading up to the coup that removed 
President Isabel Perón from office.6 
Before the coup, Argentina experi-
enced years of politically-motivated 
left-wing guerrilla violence, includ-
ing bombings, kidnappings, theft, 
and murders. Right-wing Argen-
tine Army Commander-in-Chief 
Jorge Rafael Videla took control of 
the country after the military coup. 
His new government vowed to crack 
down on the radical left. Videla and 
the military considered leftist ter-
ror threats and attacks from groups 
like the Montoneros as acts of war. 
The junta proceeded to combat per-
ceived subversives using techniques 
similar to the terrorists themselves 
(i.e. murder and kidnapping).7 The 
tactics in which the junta engaged 
were compounded by the agree-
ment known as “Operation Con-
dor,” in which the security services 
of Southern Cone states (Chile, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uru-
guay, and Brazil) joined together 
to counter terrorism and political 
subversion through “coordinated 
psychological warfare operations 
directed against leftist and radical 
groups”.8 Because of this interna-
tional cooperation against leftist 
groups in the fight against commu-
nism, the indiscriminate tactics 
against those labeled as left-wing 
terrorists throughout the region 
made the human rights situation 
of many Latin American countries 
dire. By the end of the ‘Dirty War’, it 
is estimated that roughly 30,000 Ar-
gentines were killed, nearly 500 chil-
dren were taken from their parents 
or born to detained mothers and 
then given to families sympathetic 
to the military with new identities, 
and more than 9,000 are classified 
as desaparecidos, “disappeared per-
sons.” The disappeared are those 
who were kidnapped by the govern-
ment and they were never to be seen 
again, many are thought to be vic-
tims of “death flights” that dumped 
hundreds of drugged prisoners into 
the Atlantic Ocean.9 As for the chil-
dren, Argentine citizens are still try-
ing to uncover their identities and 
reunite them with their families.
     Since the 1800s and the passage of 
the Monroe Doctrine and its subse-
quent Roosevelt Corollary, the secu-
rity and stability of Latin American 
nations have been of great impor-
tance to the United States’ region-
al interests. This was heightened 
during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
Latin America was viewed as a hot-
bed for human rights violations.10 
The violent actions of the Argentine 
junta during this time only further 
exasperated these issues. President 
Carter’s interest in improving hu-
man rights globally made Argentina 
a clear target for his efforts. Never-
theless, the attitudes of the United 
States government were not always 
consistent with how to address the 
Argentine problem between admin-
istrations.
Kissinger and the Years Before 
Carter
     President Gerald Ford, along with 
his active and influential Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, was a strong 
proponent of implementing realist 
American foreign policies. During 
the Ford administration, human 
rights took “secondary priority” and 
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Kissinger was known to respond 
obstinately to any initiatives aimed 
at improving human rights around 
the world. He has said that human 
rights “are not appropriate” as a 
foundational basis of American 
foreign policy.18 Kissinger’s bal-
ance-of-power approach in his Re-
alpolitik was the norm of the bipolar 
Cold War era. It was instead Carter 
and his administration that took 
advantage of the increasingly mul-
tipolar world order in the 1970s to 
advance the United States’ position 
in fighting to promote human rights 
around the globe.19
President Carter’s Foreign 
Policy Platform
     On the first day of his presiden-
cy, January 20, 1977, Jimmy Carter 
asserted that human rights should 
be upheld in American policy, not 
only domestically, but also world-
wide. In his inaugural address, 
Carter explained that the United 
States was the “first society open-
ly to define itself in terms of both 
spirituality and human liberty” and 
that because of this, it is part of the 
country’s responsibility to “take on 
those moral duties” and “help shape 
a just and peaceful world that is tru-
ly humane.”20 A few months later, in 
an address at Notre Dame Univer-
sity, President Carter famously re-
marked that America is “now free of 
that inordinate fear of Communism 
which once led us to embrace any 
dictator who joined us in our fear.”21 
This sentiment was the driving force 
ative of his department. Concern-
ing Argentina specifically, Secretary 
Kissinger was seen to be sympathet-
ic to the junta. In a June 1976 meet-
ing with Argentine Foreign Minis-
ter Guzzetti, Kissinger told him “If 
there are things that have to be done, 
you should do them quickly. But 
you must get back quickly to nor-
mal procedures.”15 Such statements 
made it clear that the United States 
would acquiesce in overlooking hu-
man rights abuses if they occurred 
in regimes that supported the fight 
against communism or served larg-
er-scale political purposes.
     During this time, it was Congress 
that took initiative in advocating 
for international human rights. Na-
tional public opinion was saliently 
becoming more favorable towards 
human rights promotion, inspired 
by American Civil Rights and an-
ti-Vietnam movements.16 One way 
in which Congress managed to 
make progress on a human rights 
agenda was through Section 502B of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
This section provided for cuts in se-
curity assistance to countries found 
to be engaging in human rights vio-
lations. Additionally, Congressman 
Donald Fraser from Minnesota uti-
lized the chairmanship of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs as an 
avenue to investigate and shed light 
on human rights violations and ad-
vancements throughout the world.17 
Regardless of this, Kissinger found 
ways to sidestep these Congressio-
nal efforts.
were seen as the product of strong 
policies focused on the national se-
curity objective of containing com-
munism.11 This understanding of 
human rights as a political byprod-
uct is exemplified through President 
Ford’s signing of the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords, which utilized détente pol-
icy in an attempt to quell the Cold 
War tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.12 The 
Accords included human rights 
provisions, particularly in the Third 
Basket, which was appealing to Ford 
because of its focus on the freedom 
of movement for individuals and the 
free flow of information— policies 
of strategic importance to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA-
TO).13 Though the Helsinki Accords 
introduced human rights into the 
American foreign policy discussion, 
they were maintained as nothing 
more than a strategic point in the 
Cold War and the fight against com-
munism. Consequently, even after 
the Helsinki Accords were signed, 
Kissinger did not implement hu-
man rights promotions extensively 
in foreign policy.14
     Because the administration’s 
priority was the containment of 
communism, it did not shy from 
working with repressive right-wing 
governments while fighting left-
wing forces. Secretary Kissinger 
was known to only promote human 
rights “as a means to a different end” 
and made it clear that penalizing 
human rights abusers through aid 
reductions would not be a prerog-
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that led Carter to believe that the 
United States no longer needed to 
cooperate with dictators and leaders 
who operated contrary to American 
values. Carter made it clear that his 
campaign promise to elevate human 
rights to the frontlines of American 
policy were not just talking points. 
It became his objective to oversee a 
comprehensive agenda of interna-
tional issues that would place the 
United States as an international 
hegemon politically, economically, 
and morally.22
The Carter Administration’s 
Stance towards Argentina
Reduction in Military Aid and 
Assistance
     The Carter administration took 
a special interest in the Argentine 
issue and sought to combat it not 
solely through diplomatic means, 
but also through withholding mili-
tary assistance to the junta. In only 
his second month in office, Presi-
dent Carter made the move to cut 
U.S. military aid to Argentina near-
ly in half— reducing it from for-
ty-eight million dollars to just twen-
ty-five million dollars. This move 
by the new President was shocking 
and unsettling to a large number 
of high-ranking officials in the Ar-
gentine government.23 It was a stark 
break from the “quiet diplomacy” 
of the Kissinger era and relatively 
unencumbering policies the Ar-
gentines had become accustomed 
to with the previous administra-
tion. Carter had the goal of sending 
a message to Argentina and other 
regimes committing human rights 
atrocities that they could not benefit 
militarily from the United States as 
long as they continued their abuses. 
Nonetheless, because of the complex 
nature of the military arrangement 
already established between the Ar-
gentine and American governments, 
there were still cases where training, 
spare parts, and equipment, were 
given to Argentina in gestures of 
good faith that certain American of-
ficials wanted to maintain.24 Others 
in government, like Senator Edward 
“Ted” Kennedy, protested any con-
cessions of military aid and assis-
tance to the regime, even if in “good 
faith”.25 Their opposition was born 
in the belief that there could be no 
leniency until the Argentine gov-
ernment demonstrated “substantial 
progress.” According to a 1984 study 
of the relationship between foreign 
aid and human rights violations, 
the Carter administration policies 
of foreign assistance had no statisti-
cal pattern of influence over human 
rights violations in the world holis-
tically. However, for the Argentine 
case specifically, there was, in fact, a 
substantial decrease in military aid 
and assistance to Argentina during 
the Carter administration as op-
posed to his predecessor.26
Diplomatic and Economic 
Policies
     The intense diplomatic maneu-
vering of Carter administration 
officials and their Argentine coun-
terparts highlights a striking differ-
ence in the priorities of each coun-
try. Both leaders were convinced 
in the necessity of their actions so 
negotiations were not expected to 
be easy. Videla’s government truly 
seemed to believe that what it was 
doing— detaining people suspected 
of being subversives and then sub-
jecting them to torture, rape, and 
even murder—was necessary and 
just action for protecting Argentine 
national security interests.27 None-
theless, Videla’s government, like 
others in Latin America at the time, 
did not want to be diplomatically or 
economically isolated and discred-
ited by the global system. For this 
reason, President Carter utilized 
diplomatic engagements, such as 
the September 1977 Panama Canal 
Treaty, to raise his concerns to Vide-
la and others over the atrocities he 
saw occurring in their countries.28 
On such occasions, he even made 
specific requests for the release of 
prisoners in Argentina as well as the 
publication of comprehensive lists 
of detained and disappeared per-
sons in the country.29
     In conjunction with diplomatic 
attempts to reason with Videla, the 
Carter administration also refused 
to support twenty-eight loans to 
Argentina from International Fi-
nancial Institutions (IFIs).30 The 
administration believed its defi-
ance in not supporting IFI loans to 
Argentina and countries in similar 
situations served as a strong signal 
of its disapproval of totalitarian and 
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abusive policies.31 This sentiment, 
while successful in theory, was also 
only as effective as the entire in-
ternational community’s resolve 
to impose economic punishment 
on these countries. Unfortunately, 
many of these loans passed through 
and were given to Argentina despite 
abstention from the United States. It 
is not, however, that the diplomat-
ic and economic attempts to push 
Argentina to end its abusive tirade 
were failures; in turn, these actions 
indicated that the Carter admin-
istration moved on its own in this 
regard before human rights agendas 
took hold in the foreign policy plat-
forms of the international commu-
nity at-large.
Effects of the Administra-
tion’s Policies
      Not every attempt by the Carter 
administration to promote human 
rights in Argentina was a definitive 
success. Private industry, as well as 
alternative sources of military aid 
and economic support to Argentina 
by other countries, hampered the 
administration’s objective of pres-
suring the junta into submission.32 
Carter could not merely force Ar-
gentina’s hand and induce them to 
implement policies favored by the 
United States. Nevertheless, the 
economic and military pressures 
placed upon Argentina by the Car-
ter administration did make clear 
that the junta’s human rights abus-
es would no longer be tolerated by 
the United States.33 Through this, 
the administration made substan-
tial improvements in the American 
institutional system for internation-
al human rights promotion. Carter 
and his team in the State Depart-
ment attempted to provide teeth to 
the Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, previously 
handicapped under Kissinger, by 
bringing in civil rights experts and 
putting their objectives into the 
light for the American public.34
     Unfortunately, the Carter admin-
istration’s successes in some oth-
er parts of the world were bleaker 
than they proved to be in Argen-
tina–– the Iran Hostage Crisis is a 
primary example. These shortcom-
ings drew much criticism and in-
fluenced Carter’s successor, Ronald 
Reagan, to revert to similar policies 
of the Kissinger era. Relatively early 
in his time in office, President Rea-
gan denigrated human rights pol-
icies and relegated them to a lower 
priority than Carter had done. The 
new administration viewed Carter’s 
concerns for human rights at the 
expense of American national se-
curity interests as weak and began 
to show support for the Argentine 
government.35 Reagan thought that 
the country needed a more “realis-
tic” approach to human rights and 
foreign affairs, but by his second 
term moved back toward a more 
Carter-esque, positive stance on the 
importance of human rights.36
     Carter’s successors each took a 
different approach to resolve the 
complex nature of institutionaliz-
ing human rights policies in diverse 
countries around the globe. Ronald 
Reagan attempted a neoconserva-
tive approach similar to that of Ford 
before slightly softening his policies; 
George H. W. Bush tried to be more 
pragmatic in his handling of human 
rights and, in many ways, still did 
not succeed; Bill Clinton did not 
seem to have a specific foreign poli-
cy orientation in any sense; George 
W. Bush’s foreign policy was domi-
nated by the War on Terror, in which 
human rights took a back seat; and 
Barack Obama moved closer to 
Carter’s vision of globally connected 
societies that strived to promote hu-
man rights.37 Today, President Don-
ald Trump’s administration seems 
to be backing away from an inter-
national human rights-centered for-
eign policy agenda as it turns to a 
more nationalist focus. 
Conclusion
     Many historians and politicians 
alike assess President Jimmy Car-
ter’s emphasis on human rights as 
the preeminent focus in his foreign 
policy agenda to be idealist at best. 
He indeed placed the moral virtue 
of what he saw to be at the core of 
the American people at the center of 
his policymaking. However, it was 
Carter’s conception of the United 
States’ role in the world as one in 
which “idealism was a practical and 
realistic approach to foreign affairs” 
and a vehicle to exert American in-
fluence.38 When looked at holistical-
ly, his global affairs policies were not 
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always able to meet the high stan-
dards set out by his “absolute” com-
mitment to human rights promo-
tion. However, it is not accurate to 
say that President Jimmy Carter and 
those in his administration were 
unsuccessful in promoting human 
rights in the region. Their policies 
changed US.-Latin American rela-
tions in a way that demonstrated the 
US government would not always 
be bedfellows with abusive regimes. 
Furthermore, President Carter 
showed the world that his policies 
were making headway in combating 
the gross human rights violations 
in the hemisphere through the cre-
ation of the Interamerican Commis-
sion on Human Rights and Interam-
erican Court on Human Rights.39 
     No presidential administration 
after Carter has made any great-
er improvements in balancing the 
implementation problems faced by 
human rights-oriented policies with 
the vast array of American nation-
al security and political interests.40 
Nevertheless, in the words of former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Pub-
lic Affairs William Hodding Carter, 
“the most extraordinary departure 
from American foreign policy in 
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